Authors speak of the 'weakness of political parties' both at the outset of Ukraine's 'transition' in 1993 and fourteen years onwards (Wilson and Bilous 1993: 693; D'Anieri 2007: 43) , and in 2008 still, 'Ukraine's party system is undeveloped and fluid' (Slomczynski et al. 2008: 93) . Indeed, 'the parties' status and role have been persistently and deliberately undermined for more than a decade and a half ' (Riabchuk 2008: 44) . Parties in Ukraine are 'of marginal importance in Ukraine' and 'often vehicles for oligarchic interests ' (Van Zon 2005: 17) . Also, 'most parties' "ideologies" are very similar and ideology does not play a decisive role. Ukrainian parties are for the most part of the clientelistic leadership type that relies on other mechanisms for electoral success than on representing and aggregating voters' preferences and societal interests.' (Zimmer 2003: 11) . Finally, '[p] arties, as it has turned out, are short of a broad social base, their ideology and program inadequately reflect current problems, they do not have a vision on the development of society, and they lack the capacity to function properly.' 46 The above characterizations suggest that providers of assistance in Georgia and Ukraine have a formidable job at hand in helping parties transform into more democratic and representative organizations. Providers of assistance face an uphill struggle in which they can expect to achieve modest results at best. In any event, the state of party development in Georgia and Ukraine at different moments has important implications for what types of assistance programs are called for, as well as for the potential effectiveness of these programs. This chapter looks into the material with which providers of assistance have worked in Georgia and Ukraine -political parties during the second decade of multi-party politics, from the late 1990s until [2007] [2008] . The first section identifies the defining outcomes of party politics in Georgia and Ukraine over the course of this period -an extraordinary degree of volatility in party politics, and the impact on party politics of (semi-)authoritarianismand sets these off against the outcomes of party politics in Western half of the postcommunist world, Central and Eastern Europe,. The second section explores the extent of volatility in party politics in Georgia and Ukraine, and discusses the difficulties of studying party politics in conditions of 'fluid' party politics. The following three sections explicate three variables that have enabled the particular outcomes of party politics in Georgia and Ukraine -elite 'ownership' of parties, undemocratic practices in party creation and operation, and the limited leverage of parties. Starting from the observation that party creation and operation are almost exclusively led by elite actors, the sixth section sheds light on party politics in Georgia and Ukraine by looking into the incentive structures of political party 'entrepreneurs'. The following two sections, which move away from theory to a more empirically grounded discussion, review the dynamics of party politics in Georgia and Ukraine in the second decade of multi-party politics, and argue for a classification of parties in these countries on the basis of variables -foremost incentive structures and party originthat have been most distinctive for these cases. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key implications for party assistance which flow from the analysis in previous sections.
DIVERGENT TRAJECTORIES
In most countries that were once part of the 'third wave of democratization', political parties are subject to a 'standard lament' (Carothers 2006a: 3-21) . According to this lament, parties lack programmatic distinction, do not genuinely represent people's interests, spring into action only around election time, are leader-centric, and are illprepared to take up the responsible task of governing. These defects, unsurprisingly, not be less versatile than may once have been expected (Kitschelt et al. 1999) . Much less analysis has been directed to party politics in the former Soviet Union (FSU) . A large share of the available literature centers on individual countries, mostly Russia, and has a limited focus, while few studies engage in cross-national comparison. 47 When viewing party politics in the FSU in a wider perspective, the closest point of reference, naturally, remains the other, more democratic half of the post-communist world. In many former Soviet republics the party landscape changed radically from election to election since independence was gained, and on average more so than in CEE states. 48 Whereas in the majority of CEE countries one can reasonably speak of the gradual emergence of party systems, whatever was there in terms of parties at random moments in FSU states by and large constituted a loose collection of transient political forces which failed to develop patterns of interaction. As Sanchez (2008a) argues, these loose collections of parties should not be referred to as 'inchoate' or 'weakly institutionalized' party systems, but rather as party 'non-systems'. Changes in the supply of parties in these non-systems were less the outcome of changes in voters' preferences, as electoral volatility is often understood, than of the creation of new forces and abandonment of existing forces by political 'entrepreneurs', who tended to view parties as disposable 'projects' which had been designed to satisfy short-range objectives. Parties mostly remained utterly weak institutions, more so than in CEE countries, where in most cases a core of stable parties over time has become visible and has started to interact according to more or less understandable patterns -the hallmark of a party system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4) .
Party politics in the FSU over the post-communist period has been most obviously distinct from party politics in the democratic states of CEE primarily in two respects:
first, the more volatile nature (a difference in degree) of party politics in the FSU, expressed by higher levels of electoral volatility (Bielasiak 2005: 341) and a higher replacement rate of parties (Birch 2001: 17) , but also by other factors; and second, the impact of authoritarian practices (a difference in kind), a direct correlate of the political context of (semi-)authoritarianism in most of the FSU. As will be argued in the following sections, these two outcomes, in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine, have been foremost conditioned by three explanatory variables. Volatility is explained by the circumstance that parties have only very limited leverage over the political process in Georgia and Ukraine, which in turn is an outcome of institutional factors -mainly executive-legislative relations and electoral legislation -as well as by the fact that party operation is driven almost exclusively by elites. The elite-led nature of party politics is a proximate cause of volatility, in that the actions of the elite (party 'entrepreneurs') have a direct impact on party politics. The limited leverage of parties, on the other hand, has an indirect, albeit very powerful impact on party politics, and is therefore a remote cause of volatility. The uneven playing field in party politics is a direct consequence of the political context of (semi-)authoritarianism.
The enabling conditions of the outcomes of party politics in Georgia and Ukraine have constrained the development of a stable, democratic party system and, as will be argued later on in this chapter, have presented major dilemmas for the party assistance effort. The next four sections discuss the specific outcomes of party politics in Georgia and Ukraine over the post-communist period and the impact of the variables which explain these outcomes. After the extent and impact of fluid party politics in Georgia and Ukraine are laid out (4.2), it is argued why elite behavior rather than sociological factors shapes party operation in Georgia and Ukraine (4.3). Next, the impact of the political context of authoritarianism on party politics is demonstrated (4.4). Finally, arguments are put forward why specific elements of institutional arrangement in Georgia and Ukraine have bred party system volatility (4.5).
STUDYING FLUID PARTY POLITICS
In his classic treatise, Sartori (1976) reserves the term 'fluid polities' for 'polities whose political process is highly undifferentiated and diffuse ' (idem: 244) . Party politics in these states is formless, unstructured, not yet institutionalized, and therefore excluded by Sartori from his categorization of party systems (idem: chapter 8). It only takes a look at election results to get an idea of the low level of party system institutionalization in Georgia and Ukraine. The election results in appendices one and two display the turnover of political forces between elections and reveal the instability of electoral coalitions in Georgia and Ukraine over the course of the most recent four parliamentary elections.
It is widely acknowledged that some degree of party system institutionalization is imperative for the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Diamond and Linz 1989: 21; Mainwaring and Scully 1995) . 49 Quantitative studies accordingly point to a correlation between levels of democracy and levels of party system institutionalization (Casal Bértoa 2008) . Thames and Robbins (2007) find that 'the highest levels of democracy'
do not go together with 'low levels of institutionalization'. Whether party system institutionalization is a necessary prerequisite for democratic consolidation or not, it
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has at least several important positive consequences for the performance of democratic rule (Powell 1982; Tóka 1997) . Weak party system institutionalization is believed to undermine democratic consolidation in a number of ways. In the absence of strong and stable parties, it is impossible for voters to hold parties accountable for their actions in government or in the legislature, to develop a relationship with a party, and to engage in strategic voting based on available knowledge of party behavior, while for parties it is difficult to strategically position themselves vis-à-vis political opponents (Birch 2001; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Thames 2007) . Also, more institutionalized parties are in a better position to aggregate and channel citizen's demands and to interact in a constructive manner in the legislature (Siaroff 2006: 198) .
Since most parties in Georgia and Ukraine have shallow organizational structures and lack deep-reaching roots in society, they can be easily dissolved by their leaders when they do not bring in anticipated benefits. Party turnover has been accompanied by fractionalization. Relatively permissive laws on political parties in both Georgia and Rapid changes in the supply of parties are the clearest indicator of the fluid nature of party politics in Georgia and Ukraine. Individual parties, however, have been unstable in more respects. Parties have been subject to far-reaching internal change resulting from defections or the arrival of new leadership. The degree of change could be such that the affected party should be regarded as a different entity. Furthermore, parties often did not compete as independent political forces, but as constituents of larger electoral alliances, that almost invariably proved to be short-lived. Sometimes, the line between parties and blocs became difficult to draw, contributing to the low profile of parties as autonomous political forces. Also, once parties got into parliament, they tended to disintegrate into several rivaling factions from which new parties were sometimes formed (e.g. Herron 2002). As with electoral coalitions, the distinction between parties and factions often became blurred.
As will be argued in subsequent sections, a compelling explanation for the weakness and instability of parties lies in the limited relevance of parties in Georgian and number of parties'. With regard to the Georgian party system, then, it seems more appropriate to identify the constellation of the party system, determined by the shape of the system and mode of competition within the party system, which over the last fifteen years almost continuously has been that of a dominant ruling party versus a fragmented opposition.
ELITE OWNERSHIP
The classic Once we realize that the operation of parties is led by elite actors, much insight can be gained from studying the motives of these elites. As Tavits (2008b: 549) notes, 'much more emphasis should be put on understanding the incentive structures of elites that encourage or discourage stability on their part.' Section six in this chapter will take up this challenge to help explain the dynamics of party creation and disintegration in Georgia and Ukraine.
PARTY POLITICS IN AN UNEVEN PLAYING FIELD
The (semi-)authoritarian political regime context has affected interparty competition and party development in Georgia and Ukraine (until 2005) in a profound manner. By focusing on the types of parties that have been at the forefront in Georgia and Ukraine, this section demonstrates how the political party landscape is to a large extent shaped by the impact of authoritarian practices. Party politics in a less-thandemocratic setting should be expected to display a different dynamic from settings in which fair competition can be taken for granted. This straightforward but crucial assumption is insufficiently appreciated in studies of party politics in 'third wave'
states. 57 In less-than-democratic settings, executive authorities often intentionally distort the electoral playing field in order to tighten their grip on power or to extract the rents that are accessible to regime actors by virtue of holding office. Distortion of the playing field is achieved both by checking the opposition and by becoming involved in party-building. Some regimes opt to establish a 'party of power' that towers over other parties in terms of financial and personnel resources and exposure. As will be demonstrated below, regimes may also deploy other types of parties, including satellite parties and spoiler parties, to keep a check on genuine pluralism.
Competition between parties in less-than-democratic conditions is often less about policies than about the rules of the political game. Elections may become 'nested games': 'At the same time as incumbents and opponents measure their forces in the electoral arena, they battle over the basic rules that shape the electoral arena' (Schedler 2002: 110) . Moreover, the decisive fault line in electoral competition is that of support for the regime versus opposition to the regime, with little room for political accommodation. Opposition parties will often declare democratic convictions an important motive in their struggle against incumbents, and organize protests to voice their opposition to the regime. In the process, issue-based appeals, which are believed to better structure electoral competition in democracies (Croissant 2002: 346) , are pushed to the background. Finally, the party system configuration under (semi-)authoritarianism often lasts only as long as the regime lasts, since regime change often brings about a radical shake-up of the party landscape. Party system change in less-than-democratic settings is therefore conditioned upon the regime's capability of survival. 
THE LIMITED LEVERAGE OF PARTIES
Volatility in party supply and volatility within parties, which together determine the fluid nature of party politics in Georgia and Ukraine, hinge on the lack of incentives for political actors to invest in the formation and development of viable parties. The absence of strong enough incentives stems from the limited role of parties in policymaking, in elections, and even in legislation. As will be argued in this section, the limited role of parties, in turn, is largely predicated on the institutional make-up of the political systems of Georgia and Ukraine. The elements of institutional design that are most often considered to have an impact on party (system) development, and that will be consecutively discussed here, are executive-legislative relations and the electoral system (Croissant 2002; McFaul 2001; Meleshevich 2007) . This section additionally discusses the impact of parliamentary rules on party cohesiveness.
Executive-legislative relations
Until the Rose Revolution, Georgia was a purely presidential republic, with the popularly elected president heading the executive while not being subject to the confidence of the legislative assembly. There is a reasonable consensus that presidential, or highly presidentialized, systems are less conducive to democratic consolidation than arrangements with strong legislatures in states moving away from authoritarianism (Bunce 2000; Frye 1997).
Among other things, the 'perils of presidentialism' include the personalization of power, the often limited checks on executive authority, the blurring of prerogatives and spheres of accountability of the executive vis-à-vis parliament, and the lack of accountability of presidents due to their fixed terms of office (Fish 2006; Linz 1990) .
With regard to political parties specifically, it is argued that there is an 'inverse relationship' between presidentialism and party strength (Shugart 1998; Shugart and Carey 1992: 177) . From the wealth of arguments linking presidentialism to problems with stable, democratic party development, four arguments with particular relevance to Georgia and Ukraine are highlighted here. have an interest in checking the development of strong (opposition) parties which potentially pose a challenge to the regime. Especially in a less-than-democratic setting, the regime may be tempted to block parties from becoming too influential, for instance by amending legislation, detaining party leaders, or rigging elections.
Electoral Legislation
The impact of electoral laws on political parties and party systems is extensively the mixed system has in most cases revealed itself to be, in Sartori's (1997: 74-5) formulation, 'a bastard-producing hybrid that combines their defects'.
Besides SMDs, a second alternative route for small parties and for individuals to gain representation has in Georgia and Ukraine been provided by the opportunity to form electoral coalitions (alternatively, blocs or alliances). The fact that parties often team up with other parties in electoral coalitions has been a major driver of party fragmentation. Parties with no chance of getting into parliament on their own still have the chance to jump on the bandwagon of more prospective parties and by doing so win a small number of seats, despite their lack of an autonomous support base. For these weak parties, winning a few seats is enough of an incentive not to disband their organizations. Electoral coalitions furthermore work against viable party development by allowing movements (instead of parties) and non-partisan individuals on their lists.
A final manner in which electoral laws could have a negative impact on party development was when they were frequently amended or replaced. In both Georgia and Ukraine, electoral legislation has been subject to several major amendments. 
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The overarching effect of the institutional framework in Georgia and Ukraine on party politics has been to diminish the 'positions of leverage' of political parties. Parties have often been irrelevant, or at best not crucial, in the presidential contest and in government formation; presidentialism and electoral laws encourage a focus on persons rather than on issues in both presidential and parliamentary elections; electoral laws provide alternative routes for non-party actors and weak parties to gain parliamentary representation; and a number of party functions are substituted by electoral coalitions and factions in parliament. In the next section it will be argued how the diminished leverage of parties has played out on party development by looking at the incentive structures of party actors.
Constitutional amendments enforcing a more balanced power equilibrium between president and parliament, as well as the introduction of party list voting for all seats in parliament in 2006 have brought Ukraine closer to the kinds of institutional arrangements that are believed to be more conducive to party development. Crucially, as a result of the reforms the role of parties in Ukraine has been significantly enhanced. Georgia has so far retained its 'superpresidential' system and a mixed electoral system.
INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND MODELS OF PARTY BEHAVIOR
It has been noted that parties in Georgia and Ukraine states seldom have a societal Especially in the initial stage of multiparty politics, party-building in Georgia and
Ukraine involved much 'small-scale political vanity, fanaticism, and whimsy, which have generated a penumbra of tiny "divan" or "taxi" parties' (Wilson and Birch 2007: 54) . These mostly irrelevant small parties, which are typically headed by a selfinterested leadership and of which there are still dozens in Georgia and Ukraine, may defy classification. Considering the meager electoral prospects and the very limited leverage over politics of these parties, their prolonged existence is not easily explained from an inquiry into their incentives. It is assumed here, nonetheless, following a key premise in rational choice approaches, that the more relevant political party actors by and large behave purposefully (Hershey 2006: 75) . The principal rationale underlying the activity of these actors is the benefits that they anticipate receiving from electoral success; borrowing from political economy terminology, they may be thought of as political party 'entrepreneurs' (Strom 1990). These entrepreneurs can be divided into those who operate separately from the regime and do not have access to state resources, and those who belong to the inner circle of the regime and therefore do have access to state resources that can be employed in party-building.
Because of the limited leverage, conditioned by elements of institutional design, of political parties in FSU states, nonregime actors have had few compelling incentives to invest in party-building. Parties have remained weak institutions, with the exception of a number of parties of power whose ultimate purpose was to entrench a consolidated authoritarian regime. Weak parties were prone to be abandoned by their leaders at some point. Many of them had been launched as not much more than 'projects' that had to satisfy short-range objectives. As soon as they failed to deliver, these parties were discarded by the leadership. A considerable number of weak parties have been sustained despite their failure to deliver: often, however, did these forces continue to exist merely in name, without a leadership willing to invest in them, and without any serious degree of leverage. Incentives to create and sustain viable parties, to the extent that they did exist, moreover, have been offset by a number of other factors Despite the generally weak incentives to invest in parties for actors not intimately connected to the regime, parties have fulfilled if not the representative, then at least the procedural functions which make parties indispensable in elections with more than one party. 63 Some parties were steered by the executive powers in the FSU states or by oligarchic forces and were driven by stronger and more specific incentives, and incentives of a different type, than those of actors from outside the regime. Parties of power mainly served the purposes of checking the opposition and providing a patronage network for elite actors. Satellite parties equally served to pull in elite actors and keeping the opposition small by winning as large a share of the vote as they could, while spoiler parties, a subtype of the satellite party, singularly served to drain away votes from the opposition. A more remote intended effect of these regimeinitiated parties was to contribute to regime survival. Next to the regime-initiated parties, self-interested businessmen in some countries created 'oligarchic parties' to win office in order to then reap the benefits related to holding office.
A way to picture the incentives that drive party creation and operation in Ukraine and Georgia is by extending Strom's 'three models of party behavior' (Strom 1990) -policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking -to the less-than-democratic context of Ukraine (before 2005) and Georgia. According to Wolinetz (2002: 149-50) , 'a policy-seeking party is one which gives primary emphasis to pursuit of policy goals, a vote-seeking party is one whose principal aim is to maximize votes and win elections, while an office-seeking party is primarily interested in securing the benefits of officegetting its leaders into government, enjoying access to patronage, etc.'. 
THE SECOND DECADE OF MULTI-PARTY POLITICS
This thesis studies political party assistance over the course of roughly one decade, spanning four parliamentary elections in both Georgia (1999, 2003, 2004 and 2008) and Ukraine (1998 Ukraine ( , 2002 Ukraine ( , 2006 Ukraine ( , 2007 . Considering that multipartism commenced in the two former Soviet republics near the end of the 1980s within the framework of the political reforms of perestroika, the time period under investigation here comprises, roughly, the second decade of multipartism. During this second decade of multipartism, party politics in Georgia and Ukraine has remained highly volatile. In Georgia, both before and after the Rose Revolution, and even more so than in 
COMMONALITY AND VARIATION IN PARTY DEVELOPMENT
The bulk of political parties in Georgia and Ukraine have shared a number of characteristics which more generally are rather common for political parties outside
Western democracies and which make up much of the 'standard lament' about parties. These tables demonstrate that, in both Georgia and Ukraine, political parties with a more pronounced ideological position tend to be less relevant. Formulated reversely, the most relevant parties in both countries are not primarily driven by the incentive to implement a specific set of policies, and in addition, and relatedly, fail to associate with a definable political ideology. The only parties with a serious degree of leverage in Georgia, before and after the Rose Revolution, have been the parties of power. As auxiliary organizations of the regime, these parties of power are ideologically diffuse 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL PARTY ASSISTANCE
The implications for party assistance that follow from the discussion on the domestic constraints on party development in Georgia and Ukraine in this section, are simple.
Most evidently, the effectiveness of party assistance has been impaired by the large degree of volatility in party politics in Georgia and Ukraine. Parties that were assisted were likely either not to survive or to become subject to far-reaching internal change.
Indeed, most parties that have been assisted over the years subsequently withered.
The Georgian party landscape in 2009 is still highly in flux. New parties, led by former regime actors, have recently presented themselves, and the survival of the ruling United National Movement seems to hinge solely on the survival of the regime. In
Ukraine, a modicum of continuity has become discernable in recent years. Within-bloc volatility, however, is considerable. Moreover, the party that has by far has received most attention from providers of assistance, People's Union Our Ukraine, in 2009 is near extinction.
Even more crucially, a substantial share of the more relevant Georgian and Ukrainian parties that have received assistance were really unsuitable to receive assistance because the operation of these parties was driven by incentives that were incompatible with the norms and values that party assistance sought to infuse in party politics. This applies foremost to the regime-initiated vote-seeking parties (parties of power and spoiler parties) and to office-seeking 'oligarchic' parties. These parties were not interested in becoming constituents in a future stable and democratic party system, an observation that was echoed, for instance, in a USAID-commissioned assessment of political parties in Georgia in 2001 which found that 'limited interest exists within the major political parties to transform themselves into well-structured democratic organizations presenting the public with credible, differentiated policy platforms ' (Black et al. 2001: iii) .
107
Finally, even if parties would be receptive to assistance, as a form of democracy promotion party assistance would still have been unlikely to be particularly effective given the limited leverage of parties in political life and as vehicles of representation.
To really make a difference, providers of assistance not only would have needed to work with parties, they also would have had to address the structural constraints on the development of stable and democratic parties. Addressing these structural domestic constraints, including institutional arrangements and the unevenness of the electoral playing field, however, goes beyond the capabilities and the mandate of party assistance.
